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Abstract: From the fortress conservation paradigm in the 1960s and 1970s to the community 
based conservation paradigm of the 1980s and 1990s, the ideological linkage of people and conser-
vation of natural resources in Africa seemed to have progressed towards local ownership and local 
management. At present, however, it looks as though the limits of community ownership over natural 
resources have been reached. According to powerful actors on the conservation scene, local people in 
Africa have not been able to effectively conserve their wildlife and biodiversity and thus – in their 
view - a more enforcing style of conservation, separated from local people, is needed again. Although 
this trend is still in its infancy, it is promoted with rigour and backed by substantial financial 
means. In this paper, we use the changing discourse in the environment-development nexus as a 
starting point to examine issues of governance and power over the conjunction of natural resources 
management and development in Southern Africa, with a special focus on the role of the state. �y 
drawing on a case study whereby different states jointly try to manage the conservation-development 
nexus, here the case of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park between South Africa, Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique, we are able to better situate the role of the Southern African state within this nexus. 
We conclude that the way states are trying to govern transfrontier parks is not in par with the way 
processes of governance unfold themselves nowadays under the influence of the forces of globalisa-
tion and localisation. If Southern African states are to retain any control over the direction that 
the conservation-development nexus in Southern Africa will take in practice, they need to adapt to 
the current international governance climate, and they need to adapt fast. With Southern Africa’s 
history of enormous social disadvantages in relation to conservation, states just cannot afford to be 
bypassed by a resurgence of that same history.
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1. Introduction
The debate on the development-environment nexus 
in Africa has been raging for decades and shows no 
signs of fatigue. On the contrary, it looks as though 
the debate is escalating, as the discourse seems to 
be taking a U-turn. From the fortress conservation 
(FC) paradigm in the 1960s and 1970s to the com-
munity based conservation (CBC) paradigm of the 
1980s and 1990s, the ideological linkage of people 
and conservation of natural resources in Africa 
seemed to have progressed towards local ownership 
and local management. At present, however, it looks 
as though the limits of community ownership over 
natural resources have been reached. Local people in 
Africa have not been able to effectively conserve their 
wildlife and biodiversity according to powerful actors 
on the conservation scene, and thus – in their view 
- a more enforcing style of conservation, separated 
from local people and replete with fences and fines, 
is needed again. This so called ‘back-to-the-barriers’ 
movement goes back to the basic argument that 
economic development and conservation are inher-
ently incompatible, leaving no choice but to return 
to old colonial style conservation methods, which 
now should be implemented with more rigour and 
conviction than four decades ago.
This current debate has attracted a wide range of actors 
scrutinizing the assumptions behind and implementa-
tion of both FC and CBC. Little research, however, 
has been done on the political governance side of the 
debate (Gibson 1999). Often, reference is made to 
the importance of governance, power or politics in 
the process of implementing CBC policies, without 
attempting to understand the intricacies of how these 
actually work out in a political discourse, such as the 
link between conservation and development. Hence, 
we will, after briefly discussing the history of conserva-
tion-development discourse, limit ourselves to using 
the discourse as a starting point to delve deeper into 
issues surrounding governance and power within the 
development-environment nexus in Southern Africa, 
with a special emphasis on the role of the state. These 
will then be applied to a case whereby three Southern 
African states jointly attempt to achieve the twin 
goals of conservation and development: the Great 
Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area between 
South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The 
emphasis hereby is on the latest developments: what 
implications do the latest critical developments in the 
conservation-development discourse have on the role 
of the state in such a project, and how does this link 
in with current trends in governance in Africa?
2.  From Fortress Conservation to 
Community Based Conservation and Back?
The roots of the discourse on conservation and de-
velopment in Africa lie in the 19th century when the 
first ideas and policies emerged on actively managing 
or governing wildlife and natural resources. Alarmed 
by declining hunting possibilities due to declining 
wildlife populations, colonial administrators in 
Africa sought to find the solution by establishing 
nature reserves after the North American model, 
which propagated separation of people and nature 
(Adams and Hulme 001). Besides this inherently 
elitist and colonial reasoning, a more emotive ar-
gument also played a role. African wild nature was 
revered as having an almost mythical status because 
of its aesthetic value and grandeur (Adams and 
McShane 1996, Draper and Wels 00) and there-
fore needed protection at all cost. Taken together, 
these arguments fed into protectionist and coercive 
conservation policies in the 1950s and 1960s, later 
to be known as “Fortress Conservation” (Wells et 
al 199, Brockington 00). The core elements 
of FC consisted of the establishment of protected 
areas, excluding people and limiting or forbidding 
their rights for consumptive use, together with 
strict enforcement of these rules through a ‘fences 
and fines’ approach (Songorwa 1999; Adams and 
Hulme 001). Often, this included relocating com-
munities out of areas they had lived in for genera-
tions, creating many protected areas with adjacent 
‘border communities’ living in poverty (Hulme and 
Murphree 001). 
From the late 1970s, in congruence with the inter-
national development climate, a counter paradigm 
emerged, that of “Community Based Conservation” 
(CBC). The exclusion of people from the resources 
they often depended on for the major part of their 
livelihoods had proved unattainable and even 
counterproductive. African states did not have the 
resources or capacity to effectively enforce protec-
tionist conservation principles and neither had the 
moral justification, or will, to do so (Duffy 000). 
Moreover, wildlife numbers continued dwindling 
during FC domination, principally due to continued 
traditional hunting – ‘poaching’ as it was phrased by 
colonial administrators and European hunters - lead-
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ing to the argument that protectionist conservation 
policies were ineffective (Gibson and Marks 1995). 
Critics of FC argued that involving rural African 
communities in conservation would not only right 
the social wrongs of the past, it would also lead to 
improved conservation of natural resources.
Community Based Conservation, according to 
Hackle (1999, p. 77), adheres to three basic prin-
ciples: “(1) allowing people living near protected 
lands to participate in land-use policy and manage-
ment decisions; () giving people proprietorship or 
ownership over wildlife resources; and () giving 
local people economic benefit from wildlife conser-
vation”. From a governance perspective, this implies 
decentralisation of authority and decision-making 
and the empowerment of local people. Whether this 
can be achieved depends on two contextualising vari-
ables, according to Barrow and Murphree (001, p. 
8-1): tenure and objective. Tenure relates to the 
system defining the rights of people to access and 
own land and natural resources and reap the ben-
efits from them. In many African countries, these 
systems are still remnants of the colonial past in 
which tenure rights are generally not very conducive 
to community ownership or proprietorship of land 
and resources. Government policies to change this 
into tenure systems more sensitive to the needs and 
circumstances of local communities have proved 
difficult or even counter-productive, even when 
nicely phrased as ‘new environmental management 
partnerships’ (Dzingirai 00). 
The second contextual variable, that of objective, 
refers to the ‘core motivational direction behind 
policy, planning and action’ of Community Based 
Conservation (Barrow and Murphree 001, p. 8). 
Objectives, naturally, pre-determine how CBC 
will work in practice and for CBC to be effective 
it is thus crucial for all involved stakeholders in 
CBC to have at least partially shared objectives. 
However, CBC in Africa has predominantly been 
shaped and operationalised by western notions 
and values of conservation that emphasise “the in-
trinsic and aesthetic values of wildlife, (…) define 
conservation in terms of abstract concepts such as 
biodiversity and ecosystem maintenance and (…) 
emphasise such goals as species preservation and 
the maintenance of micro-habitats for aesthetic 
and recreational use”, whereas communities see 
conservation more economically as having to serve 
the “maintenance or enhancement of their liveli-
hoods” (idem, p 9).
While these variables have been espoused by CBC ori-
ented scholars seeking to test the limitations of CBC, 
since the mid 1990s more fundamental critique on the 
viability and validity of CBC emerged. This is so ten-
acious that Jon Hutton and Dilys Roe were wondering 
whether the conservation-development discourse in 
Africa was not making a U-turn ‘back-to-the-barriers’ 
(Hutton and Roe 00, see also: Wilshusen et al 00). 
In the back-to-the-barriers literature, led mostly by US 
conservationists, they distinguish five themes, which we 
elaborate on below: 1) the imperative for biodiversity 
conservation, ) the critical importance of protected 
areas, ) the ineffectiveness of CBC and Integreted 
Conservation Development Projects (ICDP) 4) the 
mythical status of ecologically friendly locals and 5) the 
immediacy of the need for strict protection. 
The baseline from which most back-to-the-barriers 
proponents depart is the absolute imperative of 
biodiversity conservation for its intrinsic value. John 
Oates (1999, p. xvi) argues that “substantial parts 
of wild nature (…) will be lost if those involved in 
conservation planning do not rethink their approach 
and return to the principles on which many con-
servation organisations were founded: that nature is 
worthy of protection for its intrinsic value and for 
the aesthetic pleasure it can bring to many people”. 
From there, the argument proceeds to the critical 
importance of protected areas. It claims that, as 
humans and their activities are encroaching into 
every corner of the globe, protected areas are the last 
bastions for biodiversity and wildlife conservation, 
and hence should be protected at all cost and focus 
on preservation, the strictest form of conservation 
(Terborgh and van Schaik 00).
The third theme on which the back-to-the-barriers lit-
erature leans is the ineffectiveness of CBC and ICDPs. 
So far, neither has yet shown either the conservation 
or development results they were justified by. Most 
disturbing to conservationists is the conclusion of 
many case studies4 that wild natural areas, wildlife 
and tropical rainforests are still disappearing with great 
speed and CBC and ICDPs have not been able to 
curb this. Van Schaik and Rijksen (00, pp. -5) 
attribute this failure to three major flaws in ICDPs. 
First, high levels of corruption in most developing 
countries prohibit the control over and effective 
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management of ICDP processes while ICDPs have no 
means to counter this. Second, the overtly technical 
design of ICDPs and their emphasis on sustainable use 
are not realistic in a context that is inherently politi-
cal and managerial. Finally, the assumption that local 
people are interested in biodiversity conservation is a 
fallacy. This last point is something that weighs heavily 
on back-to-the-barriers proponents and is therefore 
treated as a separate fourth theme by Hutton and Roe. 
If given the chance, local people living near or in wild 
natural or protected areas will, like all other people, 
exploit the resources for their own economic develop-
ment (Terborgh 1999, Oates 1999). Therefore, there 
can be no such idea as an ecologically friendly local. 
All these four arguments lead to the conclusion that 
nature must be protected now. If the last remnants 
of wild nature are to be saved for their intrinsic value 
and future generations, the world must act now and 
make way for strict enforcement of protected areas, 
according to FC proponents. 
With these latest critical developments in the 
environment-development discourse in Africa 
advocating for a return to more fortress conservation 
type conservation policies, does this automatically 
also mean that there is a crisis in Community Based 
Conservation or Community Based Natural Resource 
Management (CBNRM)? Turner (004) addresses 
this question in the Southern African context and 
concludes that although there might a crisis in CBC in 
some parts of the region, the true crisis lies elsewhere. 
As CBNRM, defined by Turner as being broader 
than CBC, is a central part of economic activity and 
viable institutional structures in communal areas, it 
must be able to rely on ‘effective and equitable local 
governance’, for it also to be ‘effective and equitable’ 
(Turner 004, p 14). At the moment, he argues that 
these institutional structures in communal areas are 
in a very poor shape, making the (local) governance 
crisis “the crisis of CBNRM, a crisis compounded 
by being largely ignored” (idem, p. 14). Although 
complete and convincing evidence for this statement 
seems yet to be forthcoming, Turner does touch on 
the crucial, yet problematic linkage between govern-
ance and conservation-development (Murphree 1997, 
Magome and Murombedzi 00). Drawing on this 
line of reasoning, it can be argued that the critical at-
tack on the dominant narrative of community-based 
conservation will not contribute to creating a clearer 
‘enabling’ macro-conceptual governance framework 
for tackling the issues and challenges the field of the 
environment-development nexus currently faces. The 
next section shall further discuss and explicate this 
line of thought.
 
3. Governing the Conservation-
Development Nexus in Southern Africa
The concept of governance has been defined many 
times and in many different ways, but here we 
follow Rosenau (001, p 1) in that governance 
“consists of rule systems, of steering mechanisms 
through which authority is exercised in order to 
enable the governed to preserve their coherence and 
move towards desired goals”. This definition could 
both include governance and government, but the 
former according to Rosenau distinguishes itself 
from the latter by its emphasis on “any collectivity 
– private or public – that employs informal as well 
as formal steering mechanisms to make demands, 
frame goals, issue directives, pursue policies and 
generate compliance” (idem, p 1, emphasis added), 
whereas government consists of formal systems of 
rule or steering mechanisms, usually at either local, 
regional, national or international levels. Under the 
influence of forces such as globalisation, regionalisa-
tion and localisation, it is evident in the literature 
that, from the early 1990s, there has been a shift in 
thinking from formal government, with the state 
as the central actor, to more informal governance 
where a plethora of actors, in constantly differing 
alliances and with different levels of power, are 
centre stage (Rosenau 1990, 1997, 001, Falkner 
00, Nuijten et al. 00), and this is no different 
in Africa (Callaghy et al. 001). 
This shift in thinking from government to govern-
ance has had tremendous implications for the role of 
the state, the relation between state and society and 
the role of the state versus other actors involved in 
the governing process, especially in Africa. Migdal 
(1988) already pointed towards the fundamental 
problem of the weak colonial African state being 
opposed by strong local actors in society, prevent-
ing the state from carrying out strong governance. 
These actors exert such great influence on the local 
economic, social, cultural and political state of af-
fairs that the ability of the central state to establish a 
formal system of rule and have their citizens comply 
with it was, and still is, very limited in Africa (see 
also: Doornbos 1990).
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Since Migdal’s writing in the late 1980s, the proc-
esses responsible for the shift in thinking from 
government to governance such as globalisation and 
localisation have accelerated. One of the most char-
acteristic elements of globalisation is the exponential 
growth of trade, communication and technology 
across the globe, which has rendered political, eco-
nomic, but also cultural and religious boundaries 
more ‘virtual’ and permeable than ever. All of this 
has increased the reach and capability of a multitude 
of actors to such an extent that they can intervene in 
and influence a wide range of processes all over the 
globe whenever they choose (Dietz 1996). This of 
course often leads to conflicts when many powerful 
local actors, in the wake of the opposing force of 
localisation, yearn for a revival of cultural, religious 
and historical traditions in a localised setting, prefer-
ably as untouched by outsiders as possible5. Hence, 
one of the most fundamental consequences of the 
last 15 years for the governing of common goods 
is the explosion of the amount of actors, whether 
they are global or local, to rival the state’s centrality 
in governance and the collusion between all these 
actors, including the state (Rosenau 1997). 
Logically reasoning from the foregoing, there are two 
ways for the state to cope with or react to the current 
trends. On the one hand, as post-modern political 
science would argue, the formal Westphalian idea 
of the state has always been and still is irrelevant to 
Africa, so the already tacit acceptance of the switch 
from government to governance by African states 
‘just needs to be done’ in a more conscious way by 
the most important stakeholders in state institu-
tions (Forrest 1998). The difficult task for the state 
then is to find new ways in which many different 
conjunctions of governance could be stimulated to 
form come kind of coherent and coordinated system 
that fulfils the demands and needs of society. On the 
other hand, African states can continue to focus their 
attention on trying to establish or expand effective 
authority through formal rule mechanisms within 
the boundaries bestowed upon them by colonial 
rule (Van der Veen 00), something which has 
succeeded to some extent in some cases (Clapham 
001). In either case it is important to note that 
the state is of course not becoming irrelevant. And 
although in this article we clearly adhere to the view 
apparent in the first option that different sorts of 
power are becoming more and more diffused over a 
wide range of actors, we want to stress that the state 
remains an important one. South Africa especially 
should be mentioned in this respect, since for long 
it has had a very strong state for African standards.
To say that modern governance processes under 
the influence of globalisation and localisation are 
characterised by the continuous exponentially grow-
ing multitude of actors involved, does not yet say 
anything about the relationships and power balance 
between these actors6. In the end, this is what will 
determine how the governance process works out. 
We therefore need to examine actors and power 
relations in regard to the governance of the conserva-
tion-development nexus in Southern Africa. In an 
elaborate discussion of power and non-state actors 
in global governance, Arts comes to a model of three 
interdependent faces of power that seems to link 
well with the purposes of this article: “1) decisional 
power, related to policy making and political influ-
ence; ) discursive power, related to the framing of 
discourses; and ) regulatory power, related to rule-
making and institution building” (Arts 00, p 1). 
Traditionally, one would attribute decisional and 
regulatory powers in a society to the state - although 
the state can also have great discursive powers7 - but 
with the shift from government to governance these 
powers have also shifted more and more towards 
non-state actors. Some examples in the sphere of 
the conservation-development nexus in Southern 
Africa might help to illustrate this point.
Decisional power relates to the ability to influence 
decisions that determine actions and outcomes in the 
public sphere (Arts 00). A striking example in this 
case is the Peace Parks Foundation. The Peace Parks 
Foundation (PPF) is an NGO, founded in 1997 
with the sole purpose of promoting the establish-
ment of Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs, 
also known as ‘Peace Parks’) in Southern Africa. In 
order to aid the establishment of Peace Parks, the 
PPF have offered human, financial and technical 
resources to almost all the departments dealing 
with the environment of Southern African states, 
and most of them accepted. In this way, not only 
has the PPF direct political access by contributing a 
wide variety of resources, they also have an edge in 
directing policy because they can influence part of 
the content, as the resources they offer are directly 
being used by ‘their’ officers in the various depart-
ments to make decisions in the policy process. 
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Regulatory power relates to “standard setting, where-
by a standard is defined as an expertise-based vol-
untary rule on organisational regulations, structures 
and/or procedures” (Arts 00, p 7). Regulatory 
power by non-state actors is often not as enforcing 
as state regulation, but in absence of the latter can 
impose standards to which non-compliance can be 
hard. This whole tendency is not new, but received a 
boost after the end of the cold war, even to such an 
extent that Strange (1988, 1996) talked about the 
‘hollow state’. In Africa, this is especially relevant, 
as most states have always had heavier obligations 
than they could handle, and thus it is not surprising 
that non-state actors started developing their own 
sets of rules or standards to fill ‘institutional voids’ 
where rules to guide behaviour are needed but not 
provided by the state (Arts 00). Non-state actors 
in this sense can mean anything from private actors 
and NGOs to social movements and virtual cyber 
communities (Smith 00). 
An example of regulatory power is the recent initia-
tive of ‘African Parks Conservation’ (APC), a “foun-
dation that enters into public-private partnerships 
with African governments to manage and finance na-
tional parks”8, founded, among others, by the Dutch 
business tycoon Paul Fentener Van Vlissingen. In 
line with the Back-to-the-Barriers proponents, APC 
departs from the premise that “most of Africa’s na-
tional parks are in rapid decline and if nothing is 
done, within a few years they will be lost to Africa 
and the world forever”. Therefore they “work with 
a strong sense of urgency that something must be 
done now - before it is too late” (African Parks 
Conservation website). Thus, the institutional void 
according to APC lies in the inadequate regulations 
with respect to the sustainability of Africa’s wildlife 
parks or the enforcement thereof, and therefore they 
felt the need to establish regulations and standards 
themselves. And because they are capable of doing 
so, many actors bestow upon themselves the right 
to intervene in another locale, especially when finite 
natural resources are involved (Dietz 1996). That 
in a region beset by a history of conflicts over land 
(Lahiff 00), developments of this sort are sensi-
tive issues, seems not to deter them. In reaction to 
this, states often try to balance out the objectives 
of outside actors according to state policy, but with 
little resources and capacity, this does not always 
lead to outcomes they or local populations would 
necessarily adhere to.
While Angola and Mozambique only decolonised in 
the mid-seventies, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South 
Africa Espoused apartheid until the 1980s (Zimbabwe) 
and 1990s (Namibia and South Africa.) This had a 
fundamental impact on the practice of conservation 
in the region. Only in the wake of decolonisation 
and the shift from white minority rule to black 
majority rule, did the region’s official focus in the 
conservation-development nexus radically shift 
away from the fortress conservation approach to 
include those other crucial actors: the socially dis-
advantaged local communities living in and around 
or expelled from the resources to be protected. 
Community Based Natural Resource Management 
(CBNRM), a broader form of Community Based 
Conservation (Adams and Hulme 001, Turner 
004), became the buzzword, and was exempli-
fied by such projects as Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE 
(Communal Areas Management Programme for 
Indigenous Resources), Namibia‘s LIFE (Living 
in a Finite Environment) and Botswana’s CBNRM 
programmes. 
Despite the advent of these programmes, this of 
course did not automatically also mean that all 
power and governance in Southern Africa shifted 
simultaneously in the same direction. The Southern 
Africa states have at least in their rhetoric adopted 
a CBC approach, but many powerful actors in the 
governance process have retained their fortress con-
servation orientation (Barrow and Murphree 001). 
This statement is compounded by the influence of 
conservation oriented transnational networks that 
through self-entitlement gained more and more 
regulatory, decisional and discursive power over 
conservation policies in Southern Africa under the 
advent of the process of globalisation. For a power 
and governance analysis, this adds complexity to the 
fact that, throughout the whole world, contestations 
over resources are linked to historical social identi-
ties and the cultural politics of place. In Southern 
Africa especially, the nation-states have taken it upon 
themselves to deal with these contestations in a way 
that, above all, puts the emphasis on historical social 
justification in relation to conservation of natural 
resources. This of course clashes with the increasingly 
stronger back-to-the-barriers appeals in the literature 
that we described above. How does this work out in 
practice, and what can we say about the role of the 
state in this process?
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4. The Case of the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park
We have selected the case study of the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Area between South Africa, Zimbabwe 
and Mozambique, as it illustrates and scrutinizes the 
above question very well for three reasons: Firstly, a 
Transfrontier Conservation Area (TFCA) is a conser-
vation area that straddles international boundaries and 
as such is managed by two or more states together. 
This has led the nation-states in the region to exclaim 
that they are the only legitimate negotiating actors9 
and as such suggests a primacy of official structures 
of ‘government’ over more informal ‘governance’. 
Secondly, considering all the issues involved in the 
link between conservation and development in 
national parks or protected areas, the complexities 
involved in a transboundary conservation park are 
all the more challenging and hence interesting for 
political analysis. Finally, among existing TFCAs, 
the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Area (GLTA) was 
chosen because it is generally seen as the ‘make it 
or break it case’ (Collins pers. com., Amerom and 
Büscher 005). In other words, if the GLTA does not 
succeed, it could be a major blow for the progress of 
other TFCAs as well.
The main focus of TFCAs is on transboundary 
conservation of biodiversity and wildlife through 
an ecosystem approach, with the explicit aim of im-
proving transnational collaboration and cooperation 
between the involved states (hence, the alternative 
term ‘Peace Parks’). Other main stated objectives in-
clude community development through sustainable 
use of natural resources that occur in TFCAs and the 
promotion of trans-border ecotourism (Jones and 
Chonguiça 001). TFCAs are not a new concept.        
Early last century, there were already transfrontier 
conservation agreements in North America, Europe 
and central Africa. However, in Southern Africa 
it was not until the 1980s that interest in TFCAs 
burgeoned, and it was Dr. Anton Rupert, a South 
African businessman, who really brought the con-
cept of TFCAs to the fore when he met President 
Chissano of Mozambique in 1990 to discuss the 
possibilities for a linkage between the South African 
Kruger Park and Mozambique’s controlled hunting 
area Coutada 16. These plans, however, were not to 
come to fruition until after the end of the civil war in 
Mozambique in 199 and South Africa’s transition 
to democracy in 1994. 
From 1994 onwards, the development of TFCAs 
started moving with great speed. In 1997, Dr. 
Rupert, together with Nelson Mandela and Prince 
Bernhard of the Netherlands, founded the Peace 
Parks Foundation (PPF). The main objectives of 
the PPF are to raise and allocate funds for TFCA 
development and establishment, identify and 
purchase land for TFCAs and to promote TFCA 
development on a commercial basis (Hanks 1997). 
To aid them in their objectives, the PPF have gained 
strong political support, including the heads of state 
of eight involved Southern African nations, who are 
all honorary patrons. Dr. Rupert and the PPF were 
also instrumental in getting donors, such as the 
World Bank, the German Development Bank (KfW) 
and USAID, interested in the concept (idem). In 
1996, the World Bank gave a US$5 million grant 
to Mozambique for a ‘Transfrontier Conservation 
Area Pilot and Institutional Strengthening Project”, 
with the objective to ‘test new approaches to exploit 
the synergies between conservation and community 
development in very poor areas where income earn-       
ing opportunities are limited’ (World Bank 1996,    
p. 14). Although the same document states that 
poverty reduction in Mozambique has the highest 
priority, Wolmer (00), sees the above quote as a 
rationalisation for the World Bank to extend their 
mandate to include conservation. This in turn gives 
them a ticket to jump on the fashionable ‘political 
bandwagon’ that TFCAs have become in recent years 
(Magome and Murombedzi 00).
The negotiating process around the Great Lim-
popo Transfrontier Area started in 1996, when 
Mozambican and South African provincial officials 
discussed linkages between the Kruger Park and 
Coutada 16. As Zimbabwe also joined, officials 
from relevant departments and organisations of 
the three involved states met several times in 1998 
and 1999 to discuss the GLTA idea in an Interim 
International Technical Committee (IITC), until 
they had a basic agreement in 1999. The proposed 
agreement suggested the establishment of a TFCA 
of a staggering 99,000 km², including South Africa’s 
Kruger national park, Zimbabwe’s Gonarezhou nation-
al park and Sengwe communal area and Mozambique’s 
Coutada 16 controlled hunting area (now transformed 
into Limpopo National Park), the Banhine and Zinave 
national parks and much of the land between and 
around them10.
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Figure 1: the Great Limpopo TFCA. Source: Peace Parks Foundation Website: www.peaceparks.org. 
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Next, the respective ministers for the environment 
entered the stage. They formed a ministerial commit-
tee and met for the first time in Maputo on October 
rd, 1999. There, they established an International 
Technical Committee (ITC) to which they gave the 
assignment to develop a Draft conceptual plan, a 
Draft action plan and a Draft trilateral agreement 
for the Great Limpopo TFCA under their strict su-
pervision. According to Munthali and Soto (001, 
p 9) this set-up already “negated the possibility of 
undertaking thorough consultations with all stake-
holders, particularly those that will be most affected, 
such as the Sengwe and Coutada 16 communities”. 
Moreover, not all the elements of the IITC proposal 
were taken over by the ministers. Instead of the huge 
transfrontier conservation area, which included 
multiple land-use options ranging from conservation 
and private conservancies to ecotourism develop-
ment areas and communal agricultural land, the 
ministerial meeting under pressure of South African 
minister Vali Moosa changed the focus to a much 
smaller transfrontier conservation park (GLTP) of 
5,000 km², with a focus on one land-use option: 
strictly conservation (Braack pers. com.). This led to 
friction between South Africa and Mozambique, as 
Mozambique was very keen on ‘using’ its communi-
ties in order to attract more donor funding from the 
World Bank (Grossman pers. com.). These frictions,    
compounded by the severe floods of 1999/000 in 
the Limpopo area, caused a delay in the process and 
instead of May 000 as planned, the next ministerial 
meeting took place in November 000.
At that ministerial meeting, a Memorandum of Un-
derstanding (MoU) was signed, which approved the 
plan for the establishment of the GLTP. The action 
plan proposed to install several working groups, all 
dealing with specific issues, including wildlife con-
servation, community involvement, tourism, cus-
toms and immigration, security and intelligence and 
finance, and laid out how they would be working 
towards the actual treaty. The Technical Committee 
advised the ministers to take (at least) two years for 
the action plan, but South African Minister Moosa 
refused: he wanted it to be done in one year (Braack 
pers. com.; African Eye News Service 00). Pos-
sible reasons for this position of minister Moosa are 
the amount of ‘public relations’ that had gone into 
the Great Limpopo already and to which minister 
Moosa had attached his name, the pressure from 
donors and other organisations, most notably the 
Peace Parks Foundation, and minister Moosa’s urge 
to attach his name to a big prestige project before 
his retirement as minister after the South African 
elections in April 004 (Grossman pers. com.).
Problems arose immediately after Moosa had cut 
the time for the action plan in half, especially for 
the Communities Working Group. ‘There being no 
special counters for communities at the national 
departments that the working group could go to’, it 
was very hard to come up with concrete community 
based policy advice (Braack pers. com.). Further-
more, although South Africa chaired the ITC it 
could not outright ‘order’ the other states to take the 
agreed technical action, as special emphasis had been 
laid on the fact that all three involved states remained 
sovereign actors, no matter what. Mozambique in 
particular lacked the capacity and experience to do 
their part of the action plan, which kept the ITC 
to go back to Minister Moosa to try to convince 
him, in vain, that two years should be the absolute 
minimum11.  Another way by which the ITC tried to 
raise community interests was by asking permission 
for community members to participate in part of a 
ministerial meeting. Minister Moosa refused this, 
because he did not want to lose face and saw no 
reason to permit community members to have their 
say (Braack pers. com.). Although it can be argued 
that Mozambique and Zimbabwe did not have the 
capacity for meaningful community participation, it 
has been accepted that the ministers gave only their 
minimum efforts, not recognising the advantages 
of community involvement, and making the whole 
situation look very much as though conservation 
was much higher on the agenda than community 
development (Collins pers. com.; Grossman pers.   
com.; Rozemeijer pers. com.).
In the end, however, the process did take longer than 
the one year that minister Moosa so badly wanted. 
Above all because of technical problems with respect 
to security and border issues between the three coun-
tries, the international treaty to establish the Great 
Limpopo Transfrontier Park could not be signed 
by the three heads of state earlier then 9 December 
00 in Xai-Xai, Mozambique. In the treaty, it was 
agreed that first the GLT Park would be created, 
and after that, the countries would investigate the 
possibilities for the greater GLT Area. This was ba-
sically a political compromise by Minister Moosa. 
Moosa believed the idea of a greater TFCA would 
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not work, but Mozambique was under great pres-
sure to include at least reference to the TFCA in the 
MoU and Treaty for political and financial reasons: 
Mozambique had received millions of World Bank 
dollars based on the objective of a TFCA being 
pursued, and they obviously did not want to lose 
this funding (Braack pers. com.). 
Two days after the signing of the treaty, the minis-
ters symbolically cut a piece of the fence between 
Kruger and Mozambique and several elephants were 
translocated. Yet, until now, animal translocations 
remain the only tangible outputs of the treaty and 
a de facto TFC park has not yet been established. 
Generally, this is ascribed to the way the Great 
Limpopo has been managed so far, which had led 
to several points of critique (Munthali and Soto 
001). First, critics believe that South Africa is 
mostly interested in the GLTP because it wants to 
find an area to relocate excess Kruger elephants, as 
South Africa is too afraid of a public outcry if they 
have to resort to culling (African Eye News Service 
00). In itself this does not have to be negative. 
However, the argument goes that the focus on 
animal relocations takes time and resources away 
from other policy priorities, such as community 
consultation. Second, the elephant relocations have 
taken place without prior consultation of the 
communities living in the Mozambican Limpopo 
National Park, which has caused aggravation for 
the communities who have to live with the risks of 
human-elephants conflicts (AllAfrica.com 00). 
Third, as the preferred dominant land-use option 
for the whole of the GLTP is the conservation of 
wildlife and biodiversity, critics fear the expelling of 
communities from the park (Mayoral-Philips 00, 
Trouw 004). In fact, many South African propon-
ents of the GLTP, such as the PPF, have already 
suggested that, because of the dangers involved in 
the elephant translocations, the communities might 
be better off if they would settle outside the park 
area (University of the Witwatersrand 00). A 
final point of critique considers the distrust among 
the three states in each other’s capabilities and fear 
for hidden agendas (Amerom and Büscher 005). 
With the experience of the process up to the signing 
of the treaty, Mozambique and Zimbabwe fear that 
the South African domination of the policy process 
will not stop once the GLTP is established and they 
will then lose out on sovereignty (Duffy 1997, Van 
Amerom 004), fair sharing of ecotourism revenues 
and their cattle industries because of the risk of wild 
animals carrying diseases that could infect livestock. 
It is clear from the above that the various ministries 
and ministers of the three countries involved seem 
to be the key decision makers in the GLTP process. 
Because TFCAs concern cross-border engagement, 
the only viable actors involved in the process accord-
ing to the states, are the states themselves (Braack 
pers. com.). This does not only include the ministries 
of environment, but also the departments of foreign 
affairs, the departments of land affairs and agricul-
ture, the relevant provincials departments and, very 
critical, the departments of defence, the police and 
the national security agencies. A transfrontier park 
means that border crossing by people and wildlife 
increases and that countries have to loosen control 
over their borders. It is imperative that these depart-
ments are intimately involved in the process leading 
up to the TFCA, especially so because ministers of 
the environment are often ranked lower then most 
other cabinet colleagues. A direct implication of this 
is that out of the four representatives of each country 
sitting in the management board of the GLTP – who 
are only from state agencies - one must be from the 
security agencies. South Africa has been particularly 
sensitive about this issue, as it fears an even larger 
influx of immigrants and increase in smuggling 
from Mozambique and Zimbabwe if it loosens its 
grip on the borders. All in all, it is the state agencies 
that seem to keep a tight grip on the whole process 
leading up to the GLTP. Munthali and Soto (001, 
p. 1) even conclude that “besides the government, 
none of these stakeholders [communities, NGOs, 
private sector organisations] effectively participated 
in the process leading to the establishment of the 
GLTP”. Does this mean that other actors were not 
involved, or did not matter in the process?
The answer to this question is not straightforward. 
The Peace Parks Foundation has been, and still is, 
another major actor, but in its operations, it has been 
very state-oriented. Because it knows that the states 
see themselves centre stage of the TFCA process, 
the PPF is constantly ‘supplying’ the states in every 
possible way to expedite the political process, specifi-
cally those supplies the national state would need in 
order to make policy – maps, human and financial 
resources and policy documents. Other more global 
actors, such as donors, have taken exactly this posi-
tion of situating themselves close to the national states 
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and doing everything possible to establish the Great 
Limpopo on paper.
However, for matters to change on the ground, other 
important actors need to be taken into account. 
The most important of these are the communities 
living in and around the GLTP. The communities 
in the Sengwe corridor and the former Coutada 
16 area are most directly affected. As there was no 
time for proper community consultation and many 
communities are threatened with resettlement, it 
cannot easily be defended that the GLTP is helping 
them develop through sustainable use of the natural 
resources in the TFCA. Thus, the uncooperative or 
even obstructive behaviour they have been display-
ing with respect to the GLTP is hardly surprising 
(Mail and Guardian 00). Then there is the case 
of the Makuleke Community, who own the far 
northern part of the Kruger Park. This part of the 
Kruger Park is vital if there is to be a direct linkage 
between South Africa and Zimbabwe in the GLTP. 
However, the Makuleke, as owners of the land, have 
not been taken seriously as a discussion partner by 
the national states, for instance by taking them up 
in the management board, and as a consequence, 
they have threatened not to allow their land to be 
included in the GLTP (Collins pers. com.). Other 
important actors on the ground include grassroots 
NGOs, Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) 
and private sector companies. NGOs and CBOs 
could aid communities in the park with capacity 
building, in order for them to be able to contrib-
ute more effectively to the GLTP process. So far, 
these NGOs have not been supported in the GLTP 
(Magweregwede pers. com.). Furthermore, small 
to medium private sector organisations, especially 
those related to tourism and those from Zimbabwe 
and Mozambique have not had a say in the GLTP, 
even though some held specific hunting or tour-
ism concessions dating from the time before the 
development of the GLTP started (Munthali and 
Soto 001).
All in all, evidence from the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Conservation Park strongly indi-
cates a focus by the national states on a formal 
‘government’ style of governing, instead of a more 
‘governance mode’, dealing with multiple actors 
in a flexible way. States consider themselves as 
the principal actors in the GLTP process and they 
exclude the actors from decisional and regulatory 
powers that are most crucial to what will even-
tually happen on the ground. In the meantime 
though, the implementation of the GLTP contrasts 
starkly with state CBC rhetoric, as it is clear from 
the above that especially local communities in and 
around the GLTP could have been better consulted 
and taken up in the process. Instead of doing so, the 
state has been engaging more with actors like the 
PPF, who have far better access to important people 
in government circles than do most communities 
in and around the GLTP. Referring back to the his-
tory of Southern Africa, this ‘disenfranchisement at 
large’ (Dzingirai 004), could have serious negative 
impacts on the already feeble social fabric in and 
around the GLTP, as it is the question how long 
communities accept not being taken seriously.
5. Conclusion
In this article we have argued that the current prac-
tices of governing the development-environment 
nexus in Southern Africa are not very receptive and 
sensitive to the current globalisation climate that 
seems to be more compatible with a ‘governance 
mode’ than a ‘government mode’. This has been 
shown in the case study of the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Conservation Area, a prime and recent 
example of a project trying to link conservation and 
development in Southern Africa. The three involved 
states, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, 
are still trying to steer the TFCA process in a ‘gov-
ernment mode’, while the power dynamics deter-
mining the course of the GLTA clearly adhere to a 
need for a ‘governance mode’. Unless state officials 
start recognising this and start adjusting their tactics 
accordingly, they could loose more than just their 
ability of steering and balancing the achievement 
of both development and conservation objectives 
in processes such as TFCAs. With the upsurge in 
back-to-the-barriers thinking in the conservation-
development nexus, they also risk a resurgence of 
sentiments related to colonial conservation histories 
of social disadvantages and upheavals. The same his-
tory which the current administrations so clearly say 
they want to undo.
As the back-to-the-barriers movement lays great 
emphasis on formal (state) enforced structures 
of regulation and authority in conserving nature, 
it makes the difference between governance and 
government even more profound. Where states 
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try to adhere to community based conservation 
policies in front of the public, they fail to recognise 
that back-to-the-barriers thinking is becoming 
stronger and stronger, further complicating and 
influencing the course of governing the develop-
ment-conservation nexus in Southern Africa, as 
the example of African Parks Conservation also 
showed. As this is not common knowledge, it also 
shows that the concept of power and its meaning 
in processes of natural resource governance is not 
sufficiently addressed in the current approaches 
and not sufficiently thought through by involved 
actors, especially state actors. If Southern African 
states do not want to be bypassed by a resurgence of 
colonial conservation sentiments and the potential 
social upheaval that could be involved, they need 
to delve into these issues and adapt to the current 
international governance climate, fast. 
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Notes
1 * With valuable contributions from Munyaradzi Saruchera, 
PLAAS, University of the Western Cape, South Africa.
 So termed by Jon Hutton and Dilys Roe at the inaugural 
workshop of Phase II of the CASS/PLAAS regional pro-
gramme of analysis and communication on CBNRM in 
Southern Africa, Benoni, South Africa on 4-5 November 
00.
 Of course, this statement varies from community to com-
munity. 
4 See for instance: Barret and Arcese 1995; Wunder 001.
5 See Friedman, 000, for a vivid analysis of these opposing 
forces in the processes of globalisation and localisation.
6 This is of course not to say that multi-stakeholder processes 
are only of modern times. The point we want to stress is 
that the recognition for the need for multi-stakeholder 
processes has grown strongly in the last two decades due 
to the explosion of organisations.
7 See for example Van Amerom and Büscher, forthcoming
8 See the African Parks Conservation Website:          
 www.africanparks-conservation.com. 
9 And from an international judicial point of view justifiably 
so, but, so we argue in this article, not from a governance 
perspective.
10 See figure 1 for a map of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier 
Conservation Area
11Dr. Grossman, involved in the GLTP process as a con-
sultant, even advised 5-7 years for proper community 
consultation.
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